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DNO - Reprising (25) XXV

Rex Tillerson lever i en drömmeverden.

Mulig det, men det går gjerne greit så lenge du følger opp med en "big stick".

Man må ikke glemme at USA forpliktet seg både i 2003 og 2005 til å sørge for at konstitusjonen ble implementer, de slipper nok ikke den da det er deres leverage ovenfor både Irak og Iran nå.

Videre er det ganske forutsigbart at USA`s linje i dette spørsmålet vil bli hardere fremover da det skrives massevis av artikler om at Iran vinner og USA taper. Trump er relativt forutsigbar på det punktet, han er ikke en taper han er en vinner. Ingen får lov til å vinne over Trump og i alle fall ikke skryte av det. Egoet til Trump vil nok paradoksalt nok være Kurdistans beste allierte i tiden fremover da et prestisjetap ovenfor Iran av alle er helt utenkelig for POTUS.

Bagdads respons må jo være drømmescenariet for KRG, hehe. Bagdad sier at Tillerson/Trump ikke kan fortelle dem hva de kan gjøre:

Baghdad tells Tillerson he cannot tell Iraq what to do By Rudaw 1 hour ago

BAGHDAD, Iraq--The office of Iraqi prime minister said on Monday that US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson had no right to tell the Iraqis what do and that his call for the militia groups to disband and "go home" was wrong because they are Iraqi fighters and government command.

"The warriors of the Hashd al-Shaabi are patriotic Iraqis and paid with their lives in the defense of their country and the people of Iraq and they abide by the Iraqi command according to the law of the parliament," said a statement from PM Haider al-Abadi's office.

These words came in response to US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson who said in Riyadh on Sunday that Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Iraq must go home now that the war with ISIS was ending.

"No one has the right to interfere in Iraqi affairs and decide what they should do," read the statement.

It went on to say that "any foreign or coalition forces on the ground in Iraq were limited in number and were there to provide training and logistical support and had no combat role,"

Endret 23.10.2017 14:17 av Fanatic

Og nå plukket Reuters det også opp:
Iraq dismisses U.S. call for Iranian-backed militias to 'go home'

Statement from Kurdistan Regional Government

WED, 25 OCT 2017 01:09 | KRG Cabinet

As Iraq and Kurdistan are faced with grave and dangerous circumistances, we are all obliged to act responsibily in order to prevent further violence and clashes between Iraqi and Peshmerga forces.

Attacks and confrontations between Iraqi and Peshmerga forces that started on October 16, 2017, especially today's clashes, have caused damage to both sides and coud lead to a continuous bloodshed, inflicting pain and social unrest among different components of Iraqi society.

Certainly, continued fighting does not lead any side to victory, but it will drive the country towards disarray and chaos, affecting all aspects of life.

Therefore, in order to fulfill our responsibilites and obligations towards the people of Kurdistan and Iraq, we propose the following to the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi and world public opinion:

1. Immediate ceasefire and halt all military operations in the Kurdistan Region.
2. Freeze the results of referendum conducted in the Iraqi Kurdistan.
3. Start an open dialogue between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Iraqi Federal Government on the basis of the Consititution.

Kurdistan Regional Government
October 24, 2017

Forslag til løsninger, fra amerikansk tenketank:
Making Oil the Foundations of a Political Settlement in Kirkuk -Center for Strategic and International Studies -October 24, 2017

KRG prøver å være konstruktive og innfri ønsker fra USA og Ankara. Våpenhvile og ingen oppfølging av folkeavstemningens resultat. Bagdad er det kanskje litt verre med da de føler seg sterke etter pseudo-seieren i "slaget" om Kirkuk som de facto ble en ren invitt og et teselskap for den irakiske hæren og dens shia-milits-allierte. Kanskje er de lystne på å tyne KRG litt mer.

Mens kurderne fikk has på på en amerikansk Abrams tank og det er en debatt på nett om hvordan. Det fremste tipset viser også noe av kompleksiteten i internasjonal våpenhandel. Man tror KRG har kinesiske H8-skyts og at det er kommet fra allierte i Syria som har fått den som krigsbytte der. Hvem har sendt H8 til Syria - det er Qatar sies det, som kjøpte våpenet fra Sudan - som tidligere hadde anskaffet det fra Kina på legalt vis.

Med H8 slipper KRG å bryte betingelsene for en del av de vestlige våpnene de har mottatt i stor skala, ment til bruk mot IS. Men klart om det eskalerer må de bruke alt de har for å forsvare seg.
Dersom Abadi ønsker å bli en ny Saddam, hvilket vi alle håper ikke vil skje.

Endret 25.10.2017 13:58 av Beins

Saving the KRG Is Vital to U.S. and Iraqi Interests - The Washington Institute

Iraq, Kurdistan oil being separated on Turkey pipeline - shipping source

Oct. 26, 2017

Scenarios for Kirkuk and KRG Oil Exports,Thursday, October 26, 2017, Today in Mesopotamia

Tensions between the government of Iraq and the semi-autonomous Kurdish region in the aftermath of a Kurdish referendum on independence culminated last week in the capturing of large parts of the oil-rich Kirkuk province by Iraqi forces. The military movements have so far resulted in limited actual violence as Kurdish forces, the Peshmerga, retreated from Kirkuk and other disputed (and oil-laden) districts, with relatively minimal fighting.

The dust hasn’t settled yet, and there remains risk of protracted conflict between Erbil and Baghdad, and potentially among the Kurdish parties blaming each other for the setback. The tense situation raises questions about the impact of the reversal of Kurdish fortune on the outlook for the Kurdish region, oil companies working there, and supply from Iraq as a whole.

The immediate impact was the loss of approximately 350,000 bpd of Kurdish oil exports--more than half the average export level. Oil flow through the Kurdish export pipeline connecting to the Turkish section of the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP) dropped to roughly 250,000 bpd.
Prior to these events, the contested Kirkuk fields of Avana and Bai Hassan,which had come under Kurdish control in 2014, following the collapse of the Iraqi military as ISIL swept across the country’s north, provided some 270,000 bpd of Kurdistan’s exports of nearly 600,000 bpd. Now these fields are once again under the guns of Iraqi troops.

Additionally, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was receiving half of the roughly 150,000 bpd produced by another set of Kirkuk field (Baba Gurgur, Khabbaz and Jambur). This was a compromise solution between Baghdad and Erbil in 2016 to exploit those fields which were within Kurdish held territory but still operated by the Baghdad-controlled North Oil Co.
Things have changed. On October 10 the federal oil ministry announced a plan to repair its own northern pipelines and on the 18th the Iraqi oil minister called on BP to help develop Kirkuk fields. A week later Baghdad appears to have started its own limited export operations from Kirkuk. If these signals are any indication, KRG exports may not recover from this slump any time soon.

That said, if the two sides avoid further fighting, then while Kurdistan and companies operating there will suffer, the overall supply picture won’t change by much. Let’s look at a few of the more probably ways this crisis could unfold.

Baghdad seems determined to translate its territorial gains into control over the oil exports from the fields it captured last week. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi first alluded to this in his NY Times piece on 10/18 where he pointed out that Baghdad “intends to redress the inequitable distribution of our national resources to discourage corruption in the Kurdish region, and protect the people there and in the whole of Iraq.”

The path of least resistance would see Baghdad trying to place exports from all the Kirkuk fields it captured (totaling about 420,000 bpd) under the control of its Oil Ministry’s marketing arm, SOMO, but allowing the KRG to continue exports from fields located farther in Kurdistan proper.

Baghdad sought to secure Turkey’s cooperation, since Ankara controls the part of the ITP through its territory and the storage tanks at the Ceyhan terminal. Ankara’s cooperation seems forthcoming.

Indeed, on October 26, Reuters reported that export oil coming from fields in Kurdistan proper is being separated from that originating in the fields now under Baghdad’s control. The report indicates that “90,000 barrels of Kirkuk crude has been dispatched separately from the rest to be sent to tanks owned by Baghdad.”

Endret 26.10.2017 21:36 av teo

This arrangement of alternating shipments is clunky, inefficient and therefore may be only temporary. Baghdad will likely start diverting the oil from fields under its control to be exported through its own export pipeline once repairs are complete. The technical part of this process may depend not only on patching up the damaged pipeline, but also on the status of pipelines and pumping stations at Baiji, the former hub of Iraq’s pipeline network, and at the fields themselves.

In this case Baghdad will likely be willing to bankroll the budgets for the provinces of Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah. This would be a reward for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), whose leadership cooperated with Baghdad allowing it to reclaim Kirkuk’s fields. On the other hand Baghdad will leave the ruling party in Kurdistan (the Kurdistan Democratic Party or KDP) with the responsibility to provide for for KDP-dominated provinces of Duhok and Erbil from the roughly 300,000 bpd from fields still under its control.

The new push by pro-government forces toward the Fish-khabur border crossing, where the Kurdish export pipeline enters Turkey, suggests Baghdad may have set its eyes on the whole pie. It is possible that Baghdad will try to bring all northern exports, including from fields located inside Kurdistan proper such as Tawke, Taq Taq and Khurmala under SOMO control. This would entail Baghdad agreeing in return to provide for the financial needs of all Kurdish provinces from federal coffers. If the KRG is forced to acquiesce, they will likely try to restart oil sales via trucks, as was the case prior to the construction of the Kurdish export pipeline in 2013, to maintain a revenue stream independent of Baghdad’s chokehold.

In a rather idealistic scenario, Baghdad and Erbil can manage to put the events of the last 2 weeks behind their back and work out an agreement for joint oil marketing either under SOMO, or a new mutually agreed structure. The joint use of the Kurdish pipeline, as the cheaper and readily available route for exports, would bring Erbil and Baghdad closer.

Baghdad may also seek to consider this cooperative path if repairing its section of ITP proves unfeasible. As this scenario creates economic codependence and would have to include an agreement on revenue sharing, it would be the most stable, with the least risk to physical disruption compared to Baghdad’s pipeline that runs through Salah-addin and Ninewa provinces, where ISIL could regain some ability to operate. It is, however, the least likely given the poor state of affairs between Baghdad and Erbil, which makes reaching such chronically elusive understandings a near impossibility.

The the ongoing clashes near Fish-khabur suggest that the prospects for war aren’t too slim. Should the situation lead to a protracted conflict between Erbil and Baghdad, markets can expect a tangible loss of supplies. Fighting could bring all piped exports to a halt, causing Baghdad to lose some potential revenue while wreaking havoc on Kurdistan’s exhausted finances. If the pipeline is damaged, whether accidentally or on purpose, Baghdad’s exports via Turkey would stop until fighting ends, until Baghdad designs a solution to divert the Kirkuk oil to its southern pipeline network, or until a pipeline to Iran is in place--either measure could take years.

The fact that the 300,000 bpd Baiji refinery, Iraq’s largest prior to sustaining heavy damage in fighting against ISIL in 2014-2015, remains offline means that Baghdad would be left with limited near-term options to evacuate the crude. It will have to truck whatever amount of crude possible to refineries in the country’s center and south and then reinject what’s left back into the reservoir.

Erbil, meanwhile, would revert to trucking its own oil via Iran and Turkey. The neighbors, while recently expressing great hostility toward Erbil, may decide to allow the trade and enjoy the financial benefits, as they did in the past.

As a result of these measures, even in the case of active hostility, the 600,000 bpd of combined KRG/Kirkuk exports will not entirely vanish. The federal and regional authorities will perhaps send a total of up to 250,000 bpd to be utilized at their respective refineries. The KRG may manage to export another 100,000 bpd by trucks to Iran and Turkey. The remainder, up to 250,000 bpd, will comprise the loss in export volumes, a loss that will be felt the most in Kurdistan and among the oil companies working there.

Endret 26.10.2017 21:38 av teo

Baghdad and Shiite militias begin attack on recognized Kurdistani areas By DAVID ROMANO

Last week this column concluded with the following questions: “Whether or not Mr. Abadi proves magnanimous in his victory will say a lot about what kind of man Rex Tillerson and Brett McGurk have sided with…. Will Mr. Abadi and others in Baghdad feel sufficiently appeased by the surrender of the disputed territories, or will they decide to try and forcefully assert Baghdad’s authority in pre-2003 Kurdistan as well?”

With numerous attacks now being reported on territory that the Iraqi constitution recognizes as indisputably part of the autonomous Kurdistan region, it seems that Baghdad and Iran chose the latter course of action. Iraq’s constitution forbids the entry of Iraqi military forces into Kurdistan without the approval of Kurdistani regional authorities, yet those forces now claim to be engaged in an offensive “to impose the law” in Kurdistan and “to reclaim Fishabur.”

Fishabur and Ibrahim Khalil are the border crossings to Syria and Turkey, respectively, in a small strip of land where the borders of Iraq, Syria, and Turkey meet. The problem for Baghdad is that this small strip of land happens to be squarely within the recognized territory of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region of Iraq, preventing Baghdad from accessing the Turkish border without going through Iraqi Kurdistan. Baghdad wants to export oil to Turkey without going through Kurdistan. Baghdad would also like to prevent Iraqi Kurdistan from enjoying access to Syria – or more accurately, Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava) on the other side.

To send military forces and artillery to attack the Kurds and attempt to conquer their recognized autonomous areas flies in the face of Iraq’s constitution and every law currently on the books there, yet in Orwellian newspeak the Shiites describe this as “imposing the law.”

After the peaceful retreat of Kurdish forces from the disputed territories last week, the Shiite authorities in Baghdad and Iran probably thought they could simply coerce the Kurds more and ignore the law, protests from Washington and Europe, and all semblance of decorum. The factions within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) that apparently cut a side deal with Baghdad and Tehran last week and began the Kurdish retreat should have known that appeasement to such forces most often only whets their appetites for more.

Now the Kurds in Iraq will have to choose between total subjugation – the loss of their autonomy, dignity and whatever rights they secured in post-Saddam Iraq – or a painful military campaign. Their retreat from disputed territories last week looked like an effort to avoid the painful armed conflict – an effort apparently conducted in vain given the triumphant and aggressive mood in Baghdad.

Luckily, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) at least finally appears ready to pay whatever price is necessary to defend Kurdistan’s land and autonomy. The Shiite militias and Iraqi army units’ advance has at the time of this writing been blocked by the KDP’s Peshmerga, which inflicted substantial casualties north of Kirkuk and Mosul. The Shiites lost at least 2 M1A Abrams tanks, a dozen Humvees and other equipment the Americans so kindly and blindly provided them to ostensibly fight ISIS.

This columnist also suspects that American acquiescence to Baghdad’s offensive last week only applied to disputed territories such as Kirkuk. If there remain any sane policymakers in Washington, the Americans will seek to intervene now before the situation escalates completely out of control. They can start by immediately ending arms transfers to Baghdad and its Iranian-controlled militias, while simultaneously providing the Kurds with better means to defend themselves. If necessary they can even, behind closed doors, threaten air strikes on the Shiite militias attacking Kurdistan proper. That should get Baghdad’s attention.

Whatever the Americans do, the Kurds must also immediately consider counter-offensives to disrupt vulnerable Iraqi-Shiite supply lines and capture some of the American equipment the Shiite forces have turned against Iraqi Kurds. Historically, the greatest source of armaments for any insurgency has been the military forces of the opposing government. ISIS certainly knew this when it captured Mosul in June 2014. A robust defense and a few successful counter-offensives would likely do more to bring Prime Minister Abadi to the negotiating table than any plaintive requests or reminders about the constitution or Iraq. Such successes might even restore the morale of Kurdistanis after last week’s ignominious retreats.

David Romano has been a Rudaw columnist since 2010. He holds the Thomas G. Strong Professor of Middle East Politics at Missouri State University and is the author of numerous publications on the Kurds and the Middle East.

Endret 26.10.2017 23:04 av Fanatic

US State Dept: Time is now for dialogue in Iraq By Rudaw 14 minutes ago

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The US Statement expressed that despite overtures for dialogue between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Iraqi federal government, no timetable has been set.

"We would call upon both parties right now, Mr. Abadi, Mr. Barzani, to come together and have those conversations about coordinating military activities and trying to restore calm,” said State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert at a press conference on Thursday of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and Kurdish President Masoud Barzani.

The Kurdistan Region stated it was willing to enter into negotiations within the framework of the constitution, freeze the referendum outcome, and halt military operations.

"We believe that the time is now. We would like to see them commit to a timetable for sitting down and having talks,” said Nauert.

Baghdad is yet to respond publicly to the Kurdistan Regional Government statement and continued to skirmish with Kurdish forces on Thursday.

"They are all Iraqis -- Iraqi Kurds and Iraqis from the federal government, if you will,” said Nauert of the Kurds who have enjoyed various forms of autonomy since 1992.

US combat forces left Iraq in 2010. ISIS rose in 2013 and the Americans returned as advisers, giving billions of dollars in military aid to Iraq.

"We are close friends... good friends with the Iraqi government. We are good friends with the Kurds. I'll once again say that our men and women have fought and died alongside both,” said Nauert.

Clashes between Iraqi forces joined by Iranian-backed paramilitary forces and Kurdish Peshmerga forces broke out on October 15 in disputed or Kurdistani areas claimed by both Baghdad and Erbil.

"It is a shame to see the Iraqi Kurds and Iraqis fighting … fighting one another," said Nauert, noting how hard they fought together against ISIS. "They have been successful in that. That is why we cautioned against the referendum...because we knew both of these groups of individuals would be taking their eye off the true fight.”

She was ashed about reports of Abu Mahdi al-Mohandis being a Hashd al-Shaabi commander and opening a recruiting center in Kirkuk, one of the disputed areas. Mohandis is designated a “terrorist” by the United States for his membership in Hezbollah, targeting of Coalition and Iraqi forces in 2009, and ties to Quds commander Qassem Soleimani.

"I saw that report earlier,” said Nauert. “You are correct, he is a terrorist. I cannot confirm that report, but if that report is correct, we hope his recruitment efforts fail miserably.”

The military actions this month in the oil-rich and diverse disputed areas came after the Kurdistan Region held a non-binding vote to allow people to express their desire for independence from Iraq on September 25.

The Kurdistan Region hosted more than 1.8 million Iraqi IDPs and Syrian refugees in the three-year war against ISIS.

Nauert announced Vice President Mike Pence's plan to provide direct USAID funding to religious NGOs operating in Iraq and Syria, thus bypassing the UN.

She specifically acknowledged funding for “Christians and Yezidis in Iraq.”

When asked about the Kurdistan Region's open arms for Iraq's minority groups, Nauert said the United States “honors” that choice.

"Without the Kurds the families would not have been able to come,” she added. “We will never forget what the Kurds have done.”

Seizure of Kirkuk fields sees dreams of Kurdish autonomy crumble

KRG's over-reliance on Kirkuk means it must do a deal with Baghdad.

Robin Mills, The National
Oct. 22, 2017

Noen ganger lurer jeg på om Trump enten er en genial taktiker eller en tosk. Dette gjelder definitivt i tilfellet Kurdistan der det faktisk kan finnes taktiske grunner til at USA handler som de gjør, la meg forklare:

Trump holdt en meget aggressiv tale i FN der budskapet var klart, USA kommer til å gjøre livet meget surt for Iran fremover. «No more appeacement».
Trumps problem i så måte er hans allierte i Europa som ikke på noen som helst måte er villige til å skrote atomavtalen med Iran og som ikke ser Iran som en like stor trussel som USA og Israel gjør.

En mulig strategi er da selvfølgelig å vise for all verden hvilken trussel Iran er og hvilken elendighet de kan påføre regionen. La Irak angripe Kurdistan via sin proxy Irak og slipp iranfinansierte PMU’s inn i områder med kurdere, yazidis og kristne og la disse gjøre det de gjør best (brudd på menneskerettighetene). Man kan rett og slett gi Iran nok rep til å henge seg selv.
Når resultatet foreligger vil dette bli lagt frem i FN som krigsforbrytelser courtesy of Iran med den konsekvens at USA’s europeiske allierte ikke vil ha annet valg enn å støtte USA. Da vil atomavtalen med Iran bli skrotet og USA og Israel vil være et skritt nærmere sitt mål, krig med Iran.

Jeg tror Trump allerede har bestemt seg for å lære Iran en ordentlig lekse, det er naivt å tro at han vil tillate at Iran sitter igjen som vinner i regionen da det ville gjøre Donald til den presidenten som tapte ovenfor Iran. Helt utenkelig for en mann med et ego større enn USA.

Jeg håper at USA ikke går for den konspirasjonen, selv om man aldri vet med Trump. Men utenrikspolitikken utformes av et team med folk der de gamle generalene har en tung hånd på rattet.
Generalene like kriger som er enkle å vinne - ikke langdryge saker med muslimske grupperinger som holder på med terror og bakholdsangrep i uendelige tider, og heller ikke kriger med religiøse atommakter av Iran og NK-typen.

Nå HAR usA fått til en våpenhvileavtale mellom partene, en delavtale som må suppleres med ting som ikke er løst, slik som grenseoverganger til Syria og tyrkia. USA har nok interesse av fred for å få til en endelig knekk hos IS. Den ligger rett rundt hjørnet. Dernest kan de ta for seg Iran og bremse opp der. Da er spørsmålet hvordan de vil håndtere bagdad. Må bagdad velge mellom sine USA-venner eller Teheran.

Iran har en fordel med at USA er svært upopulære i Irak. USA får skylda for ting som går galt, jfr sikkerhet og attentater. Det er vanskelig for bagdad å følge Washington uten å diskvalifisere seg i befolkningen. Det har og sittet folk fra Sadr-bevegelsen i regjeringen. Sadr-gjengen førte krig mot USA-soldateene og utplasserte IED'er for å sprenge USA-kjøretøyer.

Irak er som Pakistand - landet har langt bedre forhold til USA enn hva befolkningen synes om. Det skyldes mer politisk forståelse hos toppene - samt realpolitiske vurderinger.

Men i Kurdistan er USA og Vesten langt mer akseptert og velkomne, selv om man ikke skal lukke øynene for kurdiske islamister og kurdiske Iran-venner som også det finnes en del av.
Store kRG-grupper er 100% lojale til vesten, om de blir sluppet inn i den vestlige varmen.

Endret 29.10.2017 16:33 av Beins

President Barzani har ansvaret for gjennomføringen av folkeavstamningen om uavhengighet for Kurdistan som ble gjennomført for 1 måned siden.

Det var et lite gjennomtenkt strategisk trekk, dessverre.

Kurdistan er ikke sterkt nok økonomisk til å stå på egne bein, ei heller hadde de nok støtte til å få det gjennomført nå.

Barzani går av som president for irakisk Kurdistan

Masoud Barzani sier han går av som president for Kurdistan etter den omstridte folkeavstemningen om uavhengighet for den selvstyrte irakiske regionen.



Barzani to step aside as Iraqi Kurdish president, suspend post of presidency

Tamara Qiblawi, CNN
Oct. 29, 2017

Ja, nå blir det interessant å se hvem som dukker opp ...



Ali Oktay
Oct. 27, 2017

Årsaken til dagens fall?

LONDON, Oct 30 (Reuters) - Oil flows through an Iraqi Kurdish pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan were halted at 0100 GMT (0400 local time) after averaging 264,000 barrels per day, according to a shipping report on Monday.

The cause of the disruption is unknown, but it is not uncommon for flows to stop for some hours and then resume. LONDON, Oct 30 (Reuters) - Oil flows through an Iraqi Kurdish pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan were halted at 0100 GMT (0400 local time) after averaging 264,000 barrels per day, according to a shipping report on Monday.

The cause of the disruption is unknown, but it is not uncommon for flows to stop for some hours and then resume.

Kurdish oil flows to Turkey resume after technical stoppage: shipping source


"Strong KRG" og "Unified Iraq" - det er problemet fra i går, i dag og i morgen.
Klart at kurderne burde fått seg et eget land slik som folk flest, men de skal presses inn i det skrale Irak-bygget av storpolitiske hensyn.
Washington er redd for Tyrkias og Bagdads reaksjoner på noe slikt. Derfor kan KRG herses med inntil en viss grense. Abadi har vist seg som en hauk som samarbeider med iran-milits. Ikke bra!

Når IS er nedkjempet, vil aktørenes sanne jeg komme enda mer fram. Hva vil Donald gjøre dersom Bagdad skal "forene" irak enda mer? Saken er heller ikke lettere grunnet PUKs taskenspill bak ryggen på de andre kurdiske gruppene.

Hva Donald gjør avhenger av utviklingen i Irak. De har nå valgt å satse på at Abadi vinner valget og vil få en mye sterkere posisjon p.g.a det. Videre satser de på at Abadi er moderat og vil redusere Irans innflytelse når hans posisjon styrkes samtidig som de forventer at han i motsetning til Maliki vil implementere konstitusjonen.
Hvis Abadi enten taper valget eller viser seg å ikke være moderat er det ikke lenger i USA’s interesse å støtte Bagdad på noen måte. Da vil det sannsynligvis bli evig uro i Irak da USA vil foretrekke et ustabilt Iran-dominert Irak fremfor er stabilt Iran-dominert Irak. Mekanismene USA vil bruke for å destabilisere Irak hvis de så måtte ønske er allerede på plass i form av kurdere og sunnier. Dette kan enkelt fasilitetes via Saudi og andre.

Jeg tror også Donald legger opp til et showdown med Iran et stykke frem i tid. USA har rett og slett ikke råd til å la Iran sitte med så mye makt i Midtøsten som de nå kan få. Det vil gi Iran leverage over USA, noe som er helt uakseptabelt for Donald.

Summen av dette her er at situasjonen for DNO er noe flytende for tida.
Det virker som at nesten hele rammeverket for KRGs aktiviteter skal gjennomgås, spesielt mht transport inn/ut av KRG og de omstridte områdene som skal under felles adminsitrasjon helt eller delvis.

DNO-messig er økonomi sentralt - hvor mye KRG får å rutte med framover. Mange lever på/av KRG i en endimensjonal økonomi, når det kommer til litt store penger. Kort og godt - hvor godt kan KRG betale sine norske venner framover.
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